Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF)Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF) via the OAuthCodeFlowCallback in the camel-oauth component. An attacker can silently sign a victim into an attacker-controlled account by obtaining an authorization code in their own browser and inducing the victim’s browser to send it to the callback, which redeems the code and associates the resulting profile with the session without verifying that the session started the authorization flow; the victim’s subsequent actions and submitted data then go to the attacker’s account. The callback also allows the post-authentication redirect target to be influenced, enabling an open redirect from the trusted origin.
Notes
- The cross-site callback can carry the victim’s OAuth session because the session cookie is configured
SameSite=None; Secure, allowing the browser to send it with a cross-site request.
Workarounds
- For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, terminate the authorization-code flow in a component that performs its own state binding instead of relying on Camel’s callback; this prevents an attacker-obtained authorization code from being attached to a victim’s session.
How to fix Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF)? Upgrade org.apache.camel:camel-oauth to version 4.18.5, 4.22.1 or higher.
| [4.11.0,4.18.5)[4.19.0,4.22.1) |
Authentication Bypass by Primary WeaknessAffected versions of this package are vulnerable to Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness via the OAuthBearerTokenProcessor, OAuthCodeFlowProcessor, and OAuthCodeFlowCallback in the camel-oauth component. An unauthenticated attacker can reach the protected endpoint by sending a request with no usable bearer Authorization header, making a request that triggers the unauthenticated code-flow redirect, or submitting a callback without an authorization code. Because these processors return control to the route after preparing an error response or redirect, subsequent steps still run and may perform protected actions or overwrite the response. This affects routes configured to require OAuth and requires no prior access or special attacker-side setup.
Notes
- At the bearer-token entry point, the fail-open path is limited to a missing
Authorization header or one that does not parse as Bearer <token>; a present but invalid token propagates an authentication exception instead of falling through.
- At the code-flow callback entry point, the fall-through occurs when the request lacks the
code parameter.
Workarounds
- Add an explicit authorization check after the OAuth processor, and configure the route to stop when that check fails, so unauthenticated requests cannot reach subsequent protected steps.
How to fix Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness? Upgrade org.apache.camel:camel-oauth to version 4.18.5, 4.22.1 or higher.
| [4.11.0,4.18.5)[4.19.0,4.22.1) |
