org.apache.camel:camel-spring-redis@4.18.3

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Deserialization of Untrusted Data via the getSerializer method in RedisConfiguration in the Spring Redis component. When no custom serializer is configured, an attacker able to publish to a subscribed Redis channel can send a crafted Java-serialized object graph that the default serializer materializes without an input filter, causing its readObject methods to run in the Camel process. The same unfiltered deserialization occurs when producer read commands process values stored in Redis.

Notes

• On the producer-read path, exploitation requires attacker-controlled serialized data to be present in Redis values that a GET, HGET, HGETALL, or HVALS command reads; merely being able to publish to a subscribed channel does not reach this path.

Workarounds

• Set the JVM-wide jdk.serialFilter system property to reject untrusted serialized classes, for example: -Djdk.serialFilter=!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*.
• Configure the Camel Redis serializer endpoint option to use a non-Java-serialization serializer, such as StringRedisSerializer; setting it only on a custom redisTemplate does not protect the consumer path.
• Require authentication on the Redis instance and restrict which clients can publish to the channels consumed by Camel, preventing untrusted clients from injecting payloads.
• Do not expose a Redis instance consumed by Camel to untrusted networks.

Upgrade org.apache.camel:camel-spring-redis to version 4.18.5, 4.22.1 or higher.