org.bouncycastle:bcpg-fips@2.0.13

latest version

2.1.13

latest non vulnerable version

1.0.13

first published

7 years ago

latest version published

29 days ago

licenses detected

MIT
[1.0.0,1.0.7.1); [2.0.10,)

package registry

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Direct Vulnerabilities

Known vulnerabilities in the org.bouncycastle:bcpg-fips package. This does not include vulnerabilities belonging to this package’s dependencies.

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Vulnerability Vulnerable Version

Vulnerability	Vulnerable Version
M Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in the `S2K.Argon2Params` class and the `PGPUtil.makeKeyFromPassPhrase()` method, which read the one-byte OpenPGP Argon2 passes, parallelism, and memory-size exponent fields with only a default cap of `memorySizeExponent <= 30` (1 TiB) and feed them straight into `Argon2BytesGenerator`. An attacker can exhaust memory or stall the process with up to roughly 1 TiB of allocation and heavy CPU work before any authenticity check, by embedding these Argon2 parameters in a minimal SKESK or secret-key packet that the victim attempts to decrypt with a passphrase. This requires the victim to begin passphrase-based decryption of the attacker-supplied message or key, since the cost is incurred during S2K key derivation ahead of authentication. How to fix Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling? A fix was pushed into the `master` branch but not yet published.	[1.0.6,1.0.13)[2.0.8,)

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in the S2K.Argon2Params class and the PGPUtil.makeKeyFromPassPhrase() method, which read the one-byte OpenPGP Argon2 passes, parallelism, and memory-size exponent fields with only a default cap of memorySizeExponent <= 30 (1 TiB) and feed them straight into Argon2BytesGenerator. An attacker can exhaust memory or stall the process with up to roughly 1 TiB of allocation and heavy CPU work before any authenticity check, by embedding these Argon2 parameters in a minimal SKESK or secret-key packet that the victim attempts to decrypt with a passphrase. This requires the victim to begin passphrase-based decryption of the attacker-supplied message or key, since the cost is incurred during S2K key derivation ahead of authentication.

How to fix Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling?

A fix was pushed into the master branch but not yet published.

[1.0.6,1.0.13)[2.0.8,)

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