org.bouncycastle:bctls-fips@2.0.19.2

  • latest version

    2.1.25

  • latest non vulnerable version

  • first published

    7 years ago

  • latest version published

    22 days ago

  • licenses detected

  • package registry

  • Direct Vulnerabilities

    Known vulnerabilities in the org.bouncycastle:bctls-fips package. This does not include vulnerabilities belonging to this package’s dependencies.

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    VulnerabilityVulnerable Version
    • C
    Improper Validation of Certificate with Host Mismatch

    Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Validation of Certificate with Host Mismatch in the HostnameUtil class, whose "match CN when no dNSName SAN exists" fallback is gated on Properties.isOverrideSet(JSSE_HOSTNAME_CHECK_CN_FALLBACK, true), which returns true when the property is unset and so ships enabled by default, contrary to the documented opt-in behavior. An attacker can impersonate a target host and pass verification during a TLS handshake by presenting a certificate that carries no dNSName SAN and places the target hostname in its Common Name field. This applies only to certificates that lack a dNSName SAN and still chain to a trusted anchor, in deployments that have not explicitly set the fallback property to false.

    How to fix Improper Validation of Certificate with Host Mismatch?

    Upgrade org.bouncycastle:bctls-fips to version 1.0.24, 2.0.24, 2.1.24 or higher.

    [,1.0.24)[2.0.19,2.0.24)[2.1.20,2.1.24)
    • H
    Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value

    Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value in the processRecord() method of DTLSReliableHandshake, where the DTLSReassembler constructor allocates a byte[length] buffer directly from the 24-bit handshake length field without checking it against peer.getMaxHandshakeMessageSize(), unlike the stream-TLS path. An attacker can drive the JVM to OutOfMemoryError with a handful of small UDP datagrams by sending a single ~205-byte epoch-0 record carrying 16 fragment headers with length=0xFFFFFF and fragment_length=0, forcing roughly 256 MiB of allocation before any authentication. This requires only the ability to send UDP records to a DTLS listener, with each connection buffering up to 16 message_seq values.

    How to fix Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value?

    Upgrade org.bouncycastle:bctls-fips to version 1.0.24, 2.0.24, 2.1.24 or higher.

    [,1.0.24)[2.0.19,2.0.24)[2.1.20,2.1.24)