org.webjars.npm:proxy-addr@2.0.7

latest version

2.0.7

latest non vulnerable version

1.0.10

first published

11 years ago

latest version published

5 years ago

licenses detected

MIT
[1.0.1,)

package registry

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Direct Vulnerabilities

Known vulnerabilities in the org.webjars.npm:proxy-addr package. This does not include vulnerabilities belonging to this package’s dependencies.

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Vulnerability Vulnerable Version

Vulnerability	Vulnerable Version
C User Impersonation Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to User Impersonation in its subnet matching logic, where an IPv4-mapped IPv6 trust entry with a short prefix such as `::ffff:10.0.0.0/8` compiles with all-zero leading bits and matches every address rather than the intended block. An attacker can control the value returned by `proxyaddr(req, trust)`, and therefore `req.ip` and `req.ips` in Express, by sending an arbitrary `X-Forwarded-For` header, since every client is then trusted as a proxy at hop 0, which defeats IP-based access control, rate limiting, geolocation, and audit logging. This requires the application to configure its trust list with an IPv4-mapped IPv6 subnet using a short prefix, or any IPv6 subnet with zero leading bits such as `::/1`, and the misconfiguration compiles without error. How to fix User Impersonation? A fix was pushed into the `master` branch but not yet published.	[1.1.2,)

User Impersonation

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to User Impersonation in its subnet matching logic, where an IPv4-mapped IPv6 trust entry with a short prefix such as ::ffff:10.0.0.0/8 compiles with all-zero leading bits and matches every address rather than the intended block. An attacker can control the value returned by proxyaddr(req, trust), and therefore req.ip and req.ips in Express, by sending an arbitrary X-Forwarded-For header, since every client is then trusted as a proxy at hop 0, which defeats IP-based access control, rate limiting, geolocation, and audit logging. This requires the application to configure its trust list with an IPv4-mapped IPv6 subnet using a short prefix, or any IPv6 subnet with zero leading bits such as ::/1, and the misconfiguration compiles without error.

How to fix User Impersonation?

A fix was pushed into the master branch but not yet published.

[1.1.2,)

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