form-data-objectizer@1.0.2

```js const FormDataObjectizer = require("form-data-objectizer") const formData = new FormData()

latest version

1.0.2

first published

5 years ago

latest version published

2 months ago

licenses detected

ISC
>=0

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Direct Vulnerabilities

Known vulnerabilities in the form-data-objectizer package. This does not include vulnerabilities belonging to this package’s dependencies.

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Vulnerability Vulnerable Version

Vulnerability	Vulnerable Version
H Prototype Pollution form-data-objectizer is a ```js const FormDataObjectizer = require("form-data-objectizer") const formData = new FormData() Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through bracket-notation form key parsing in `treatInitial` and `treatSecond` in `index.cjs`. An attacker can mutate `Object.prototype` by submitting a form field such as `__proto__[polluted]` or `constructor[prototype][polluted]` to `toObject()`. The parser follows inherited properties while walking nested keys, so attacker-controlled segments can descend into `__proto__` or `constructor.prototype` and assign arbitrary properties onto the global prototype. How to fix Prototype Pollution? A fix was pushed into the `master` branch but not yet published.	*

Prototype Pollution

form-data-objectizer is a ```js const FormDataObjectizer = require("form-data-objectizer") const formData = new FormData()

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through bracket-notation form key parsing in treatInitial and treatSecond in index.cjs. An attacker can mutate Object.prototype by submitting a form field such as __proto__[polluted] or constructor[prototype][polluted] to toObject(). The parser follows inherited properties while walking nested keys, so attacker-controlled segments can descend into __proto__ or constructor.prototype and assign arbitrary properties onto the global prototype.

How to fix Prototype Pollution?

A fix was pushed into the master branch but not yet published.

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