CVE-2026-72130 Affecting kernel-modules-core package, versions <0:6.12.0-211.50.1.el10_2


Severity

Recommended
high

Based on AlmaLinux security rating.

Threat Intelligence

EPSS
0.75% (53rd percentile)

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  • Snyk IDSNYK-ALMALINUX10-KERNELMODULESCORE-19637872
  • published6 Sept 2026
  • disclosed1 Sept 2026

Introduced: 1 Sep 2026

NewCVE-2026-72130  (opens in a new tab)

How to fix?

Upgrade AlmaLinux:10 kernel-modules-core to version 0:6.12.0-211.50.1.el10_2 or higher.
This issue was patched in ALSA-2026:61887.

NVD Description

Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel-modules-core package and not the kernel-modules-core package as distributed by AlmaLinux. See How to fix? for AlmaLinux:10 relevant fixed versions and status.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nvmet-auth: reject short AUTH_RECEIVE buffers

nvmet_execute_auth_receive() trusts the AUTH_RECEIVE allocation length after checking only that it is nonzero and matches the transfer length. In the SUCCESS1 and FAILURE1/default states, that lets a remote NVMe-oF initiator reach the fixed-size DH-HMAC-CHAP response builders with a kmalloc() buffer shorter than the response, so nvmet_auth_success1() and nvmet_auth_failure1() write past the allocation; both only WARN_ON the short length and then format the message anyway.

Impact: A remote NVMe-oF initiator with access to an auth-enabled target can trigger a 16-byte heap out-of-bounds write via a one-byte AUTH_RECEIVE allocation length.

Compute the minimum response length for the current DH-HMAC-CHAP step in nvmet_auth_receive_data_len() and report a zero data length when the host-supplied allocation length is shorter, so the existing zero-length check in nvmet_execute_auth_receive() rejects the command before any builder runs. The SUCCESS1 minimum is sizeof(struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_success1_data) plus the HMAC hash length, because the response hash is written into the rval[] flexible-array tail, so the minimum is state dependent rather than a flat sizeof. CHALLENGE keeps its existing variable-length guard in nvmet_auth_challenge().

This is reachable only when in-band DH-HMAC-CHAP authentication is configured on the target.

CVSS Base Scores

version 3.1