Race Condition Affecting kernel-tools-devel package, versions <0:4.14.328-248.540.amzn2
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Test your applications- Snyk ID SNYK-AMZN2-KERNELTOOLSDEVEL-7679073
- published 14 Aug 2024
- disclosed 29 Feb 2024
Introduced: 29 Feb 2024
CVE-2023-52478 Open this link in a new tabHow to fix?
Upgrade Amazon-Linux:2
kernel-tools-devel
to version 0:4.14.328-248.540.amzn2 or higher.
This issue was patched in ALAS2-2023-2340
.
NVD Description
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel-tools-devel
package and not the kernel-tools-devel
package as distributed by Amazon-Linux
.
See How to fix?
for Amazon-Linux:2
relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: logitech-hidpp: Fix kernel crash on receiver USB disconnect
hidpp_connect_event() has four time-of-check vs time-of-use (TOCTOU) races when it races with itself.
hidpp_connect_event() primarily runs from a workqueue but it also runs on probe() and if a "device-connected" packet is received by the hw when the thread running hidpp_connect_event() from probe() is waiting on the hw, then a second thread running hidpp_connect_event() will be started from the workqueue.
This opens the following races (note the below code is simplified):
Retrieving + printing the protocol (harmless race):
if (!hidpp->protocol_major) { hidpp_root_get_protocol_version() hidpp->protocol_major = response.rap.params[0]; }
We can actually see this race hit in the dmesg in the abrt output attached to rhbz#2227968:
[ 3064.624215] logitech-hidpp-device 0003:046D:4071.0049: HID++ 4.5 device connected. [ 3064.658184] logitech-hidpp-device 0003:046D:4071.0049: HID++ 4.5 device connected.
Testing with extra logging added has shown that after this the 2 threads take turn grabbing the hw access mutex (send_mutex) so they ping-pong through all the other TOCTOU cases managing to hit all of them:
Updating the name to the HIDPP name (harmless race):
if (hidpp->name == hdev->name) { ... hidpp->name = new_name; }
Initializing the power_supply class for the battery (problematic!):
hidpp_initialize_battery() { if (hidpp->battery.ps) return 0;
probe_battery(); /* Blocks, threads take turns executing this */
hidpp->battery.desc.properties =
devm_kmemdup(dev, hidpp_battery_props, cnt, GFP_KERNEL);
hidpp->battery.ps =
devm_power_supply_register(&hidpp->hid_dev->dev,
&hidpp->battery.desc, cfg);
}
Creating delayed input_device (potentially problematic):
if (hidpp->delayed_input) return; hidpp->delayed_input = hidpp_allocate_input(hdev);
The really big problem here is 3. Hitting the race leads to the following sequence:
hidpp->battery.desc.properties =
devm_kmemdup(dev, hidpp_battery_props, cnt, GFP_KERNEL);
hidpp->battery.ps =
devm_power_supply_register(&hidpp->hid_dev->dev,
&hidpp->battery.desc, cfg);
...
hidpp->battery.desc.properties =
devm_kmemdup(dev, hidpp_battery_props, cnt, GFP_KERNEL);
hidpp->battery.ps =
devm_power_supply_register(&hidpp->hid_dev->dev,
&hidpp->battery.desc, cfg);
So now we have registered 2 power supplies for the same battery, which looks a bit weird from userspace's pov but this is not even the really big problem.
Notice how:
- This is all devm-maganaged
- The hidpp->battery.desc struct is shared between the 2 power supplies
- hidpp->battery.desc.properties points to the result from the second devm_kmemdup()
This causes a use after free scenario on USB disconnect of the receiver:
- The last registered power supply class device gets unregistered
- The memory from the last devm_kmemdup() call gets freed, hidpp->battery.desc.properties now points to freed memory
- The first registered power supply class device gets unregistered, this involves sending a remove uevent to userspace which invokes power_supply_uevent() to fill the uevent data
- power_supply_uevent() uses hidpp->battery.desc.properties which now points to freed memory leading to backtraces like this one:
Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffb2140e017f08
...
Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: RIP: 0010:power_supply_uevent+0xee/0x1d0
...
Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ? power_supply_uevent+0xee/0x1d0
Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ? power_supply_uevent+0x10d/0x1d0
Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: dev_uevent+0x10f/0x2d0
Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: kobject_uevent_env+0x291/0x680
Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel:
---truncated---
References
- http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-52478
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/093af62c023537f097d2ebdfaa0bc7c1a6e874e1
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/28ddc1e0b898291323b62d770b1b931de131a528
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/44481b244fcaa2b895a53081d6204c574720c38c
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ca0c4cc1d215dc22ab0e738c9f017c650f3183f5
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd0e2bf7fb22fe9b989c59c42dca06367fd10e6b
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dac501397b9d81e4782232c39f94f4307b137452
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f7b2c7d9831af99369fe8ad9b2a68d78942f414e
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd72ac9556a473fc7daf54efb6ca8a97180d621d