CVE-2026-80778 Affecting kernel6.18-modules-extra-common package, versions <1:6.18.48-107.148.amzn2023
Threat Intelligence
The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applications- Snyk IDSNYK-AMZN2023-KERNEL618MODULESEXTRACOMMON-20250100
- published29 Sept 2026
- disclosed4 Sept 2026
Introduced: 4 Sep 2026
NewCVE-2026-80778 (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
Upgrade Amazon-Linux:2023 kernel6.18-modules-extra-common to version 1:6.18.48-107.148.amzn2023 or higher.
This issue was patched in ALAS2023-2026-3139.
NVD Description
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel6.18-modules-extra-common package and not the kernel6.18-modules-extra-common package as distributed by Amazon-Linux.
See How to fix? for Amazon-Linux:2023 relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
futex/pi: Reject cross-mm private futex owners
A private futex key borrows the waiter's mm without taking an mm_users reference. Nevertheless, attach_to_pi_owner() currently accepts an owner from a different address space and copies the private key into the owner's PI state.
When that owner exits, exit_pi_state_list() uses the saved key to find the hash bucket and acquires a reference to the waiter's private hash. If the last user of the waiter's mm exits concurrently, futex_hash_free() frees the hash while the owner still uses its bucket and reference.
Prevent this by validating in attach_to_pi_owner() that, for private futexes, the owner mm and waiter mm are the same. Perform the check with the owner's pi_lock held and after validating owner::futex::state to serialize against a concurrent PI-state exit cleanup.
[ tglx: Amended comment ]
References
- http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2026-80778
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b92e5562653b5293529f63b0300837d9dcedbd7
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/43b148d796aa338858792d0167cebdc12b8cb4b9
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/59b3732f95dda1fbd2234514d35f4fb6b5bb6d85
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f7fb3e07752688842cbe0b85cf0d98c2fbf76b68