The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applicationsUpgrade Amazon-Linux:2023 kernel6.18-modules-extra-common to version 1:6.18.56-125.164.amzn2023 or higher.
This issue was patched in ALAS2023-2026-3251.
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel6.18-modules-extra-common package and not the kernel6.18-modules-extra-common package as distributed by Amazon-Linux.
See How to fix? for Amazon-Linux:2023 relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tpm: Disable TPM on null key name mismatch
The null key name check exists to protect against TPM reset attacks, so a mismatch should stop the device from serving further requests. Currently it does not disable the chip when it finds a mismatch.
The mismatch is logged:
tpm tpm0: null key integrity check failed
but the chip keeps serving commands:
/ # tpm2_getcap -c properties-fixed
TPM_PT_FAMILY_INDICATOR:
as UINT32: 0x08322e3000
as string: "2.0"
...
tpm2_load_null() where the null key name check is run sets the chip as disabled only if the rc is non zero. When the mismatch is seen, rc is zero at that point and it returns success. The other issue is that the caller expects the null key handle to be populated when the function returns 0 which it does here without writing the handle and proceeds assuming the null key handle is valid.
During the test, I noticed that tpm2_start_auth_session() uses the uninitialized stack value as the key handle since tpm2_load_null() returns 0 despite the integrity failure and proceeds with TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESS with this value as salt key handle.
Set rc to -ENODEV on the mismatch. The error path then disables the chip and returns the correct code to the caller.
Tested in QEMU with swtpm and CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC=y by making TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_LOAD fail with TPM2_RC_INTEGRITY and changing the name of the re-created null key. The chip is now disabled on the mismatch.