Race Condition Affecting kernel-64k-devel-matched package, versions *
Threat Intelligence
The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applications- Snyk IDSNYK-CENTOS10-KERNEL64KDEVELMATCHED-21742304
- published27 Oct 2026
- disclosed23 Oct 2026
Introduced: 23 Oct 2026
NewCVE-2026-99059 (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
There is no fixed version for Centos:10 kernel-64k-devel-matched.
NVD Description
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel-64k-devel-matched package and not the kernel-64k-devel-matched package as distributed by Centos.
See How to fix? for Centos:10 relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wireguard: noise: reject response consumption after intermediate initiation
Two threads begin processing the identical response message, received twice. The first thread, A, runs. While it's running, the second one, B, gets partway through, and during that slow calculation, or even while blocking on down_write(), A completes and then also a handshake initiation that's already been queued up runs in thread C, which itself takes that same down_write(). The handshake initiation creation succeeds, and sets the state back to waiting-for-response, and calls up_write(), at which point thread B resumes, because either its finished its calculations or was finally allowed to acquire down_write(). Thread B then copies the state back to the peer, and begins a new session, using that state, which is the same session as the one made in thread A.
Thread A Thread B Thread C
down_read() sA = handshake->state memcpy(cA, handshake->crypto) up_read() if (sA != 1) goto fail slow_crypto(cA) down_read() sB = handshake->state memcpy(cB, handshake->crypto) up_read() if (sB != 1) goto fail slow_crypto(cB) down_write() if (sA != handshake->state) goto fail memcpy(handshake->crypto, cA) handshake->state = 2 up_write() down_write() if (handshake->state != 2) goto fail derive_session(handshake->crypto) up_write() down_write() slow_crypto(handshake->crypto) handshake->state = 1 up_write() down_write() if (sB != handshake->state) goto fail memcpy(handshake->crypto, cB) handshake->state = 2 up_write() down_write() if (handshake->state != 2) goto fail derive_session(handshake->crypto) up_write()
This seems basically impossible to hit in a meaningful way in practice, but ensure that it absolutely cannot happen by comparing the ephemeral private key that's on the stack with the latest one that the peer's handshake state has.
References
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2559730
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-99059
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3bec3d32c2a3afd164fc87f95457df2cf9049c20
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4d64a3d6e96aa78619c9c29ffde309794974588a
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c76a80db593096edf2b3b3972f58b6342a8c6c04
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d0305f8d90029556260c6824b61c493c424eba9e
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb5ce4c7790c3eeec820302d08d70ecf46af4295