Improper Cross-boundary Removal of Sensitive Data Affecting kernel-debug-devel-matched package, versions *
Threat Intelligence
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Test your applications- Snyk IDSNYK-CENTOS10-KERNELDEBUGDEVELMATCHED-19136648
- published21 Aug 2026
- disclosed15 Aug 2026
Introduced: 15 Aug 2026
NewCVE-2026-74278 (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
There is no fixed version for Centos:10 kernel-debug-devel-matched.
NVD Description
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel-debug-devel-matched package and not the kernel-debug-devel-matched package as distributed by Centos.
See How to fix? for Centos:10 relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: seq: Fix kernel heap address leak in bounce_error_event()
The comment above bounce_error_event() documents that user clients should receive SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_BOUNCE with the original event embedded as variable-length data, while kernel clients should receive SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_KERNEL_ERROR with a quoted kernel pointer.
However, the implementation unconditionally uses SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_KERNEL_ERROR with data.quote.event set to the raw struct snd_seq_event pointer for all clients. When a bounce error event is delivered to a USER_CLIENT via snd_seq_read(), the kernel heap address in data.quote.event is exposed to userspace through copy_to_user() in the fixed-length branch.
This is a distinct leak path from the one addressed by commit 705dd6dcbc0e ("ALSA: seq: Clear variable event pointer on read"), which sanitizes data.ext.ptr in the variable-length branch of snd_seq_read(). The bounce_error_event() leak uses fixed-length events that take the else branch where no sanitization occurs.
Differentiate the bounce event by client type. For USER_CLIENT, send SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_BOUNCE with SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_LENGTH_VARIABLE and data.ext pointing to the original event. The variable-length path in snd_seq_event_dup() copies the event data into chained cells, and snd_seq_expand_var_event() copies only the content -- never the pointer -- to userspace. For KERNEL_CLIENT, keep the existing SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_KERNEL_ERROR behavior with the quoted pointer.
References
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2516877
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-74278
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0527a56cb327021cb73167cfddf0e49efa043500
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/93d260ce43a81df579c98bee92b91316df9c1c57
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dae23c545eb5a2be3b27a82fd0f611894fb8ab69
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/efc86691e4d8083d9e380ea95042c2cf679f65fd