Race Condition Affecting kernel-devel-matched package, versions *


Severity

Recommended
medium

Based on CentOS security rating.

Threat Intelligence

EPSS
0.17% (7th percentile)

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  • Snyk IDSNYK-CENTOS10-KERNELDEVELMATCHED-17805772
  • published3 Jul 2026
  • disclosed2 Jul 2026

Introduced: 2 Jul 2026

NewCVE-2026-53357  (opens in a new tab)
CWE-366  (opens in a new tab)

How to fix?

There is no fixed version for Centos:10 kernel-devel-matched.

NVD Description

Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel-devel-matched package and not the kernel-devel-matched package as distributed by Centos. See How to fix? for Centos:10 relevant fixed versions and status.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: fix UAF in l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() vs l2cap_conn_del()

bt_accept_dequeue() unlinks a not-yet-accepted child from the parent accept queue and release_sock()s it before returning, so the returned sk has no caller reference and is unlocked.

l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() walks these children on listening-socket close. A concurrent HCI disconnect drives hci_rx_work -> l2cap_conn_del() which runs l2cap_chan_del() + l2cap_sock_kill() and frees the child sk and its l2cap_chan; cleanup_listen() then uses both:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in l2cap_sock_kill l2cap_sock_kill / l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen / __x64_sys_close Freed by: l2cap_conn_del -> l2cap_sock_close_cb -> l2cap_sock_kill

This is distinct from the two fixes already in this area: commit e83f5e24da741 ("Bluetooth: serialize accept_q access") serialises the accept_q list/poll and takes temporary refs inside bt_accept_dequeue(), and CVE-2025-39860 serialises the userspace close()/accept() race by calling cleanup_listen() under lock_sock() in l2cap_sock_release(). Neither covers l2cap_conn_del() running from hci_rx_work, so this UAF still reproduces on current bluetooth/master.

Take the reference at the source: bt_accept_dequeue() does sock_hold() while sk is still locked, before release_sock(); callers sock_put(). cleanup_listen() pins the chan with l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero() under a brief child sk lock (serialising vs l2cap_sock_teardown_cb()), drops it before l2cap_chan_lock(), and skips a duplicate l2cap_sock_kill() on SOCK_DEAD. conn->lock is not taken here: cleanup_listen() runs under the parent sk lock and that would invert conn->lock -> chan->lock -> sk_lock (lockdep).

KASAN/SMP: an unprivileged listen/close vs HCI-disconnect race produced 12 use-after-free reports per run before this change; 0, and no lockdep report, over 1600+ raced iterations after it on bluetooth/master.

CVSS Base Scores

version 3.1