Out-of-bounds Read Affecting kernel-rt-debug-modules package, versions *
Threat Intelligence
The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
Do your applications use this vulnerable package?
In a few clicks we can analyze your entire application and see what components are vulnerable in your application, and suggest you quick fixes.
Test your applications- Snyk IDSNYK-CENTOS10-KERNELRTDEBUGMODULES-20206628
- published29 Sept 2026
- disclosed24 Sept 2026
Introduced: 24 Sep 2026
NewCVE-2026-93805 (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
There is no fixed version for Centos:10 kernel-rt-debug-modules.
NVD Description
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel-rt-debug-modules package and not the kernel-rt-debug-modules package as distributed by Centos.
See How to fix? for Centos:10 relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: validate rx/tx MLME callback frame lengths before access
cfg80211_rx_mlme_mgmt() and cfg80211_tx_mlme_mgmt() call tracepoints before rejecting frames shorter than the frame-control field. After that, they only require len >= 2 before dispatching into subtype handlers that assume their fixed fields are present.
The frames that trip this are not shorter than 2 bytes; they are short relative to their subtype. mwifiex is a concrete in-tree example on the length side: mwifiex_process_mgmt_packet() only requires a 4-address ieee80211_hdr plus the 2-byte firmware length prefix before handing the frame to cfg80211_rx_mlme_mgmt(). After stripping the length prefix and removing addr4, pkt_len can be exactly 24: a bare 3-address management header with no reason-code body. The existing WARN_ON(len < 2) does not fire on such a frame, and cfg80211_process_deauth() then reads u.deauth.reason_code as a two-byte access starting at offset 24, immediately past the 24-byte buffer.
Add a frame-control length gate, then validate each subtype's minimum frame size in an if/else-if chain that mirrors the dispatch logic. Trace only after the frame is known to be well-formed.
Side effects of this change:
- The WARN_ON(len < 2) is dropped. It only guarded the frame_control read, never the subtype fixed fields, and it does not fire on the frames that actually trigger the out-of-bounds read (which are >= 2). The len >= 2 check is kept as the guard before dereferencing frame_control, but without the warning: these are exported callbacks and a malformed frame from a driver should be dropped silently rather than backtraced.
- cfg80211_tx_mlme_mgmt() previously routed every non-deauth subtype through disassociation handling; it now silently ignores unrecognised subtypes.
References
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2540380
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-93805
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0ec738a0d361d7eb37188117166d201f9df622d3
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f4127a93cf60d561ad39849a9ac763ba0e14db5
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d5e4586546974179feca305a94e07fac3e9727fe