The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applicationsThere is no fixed version for Centos:10 libperf.
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream libperf package and not the libperf package as distributed by Centos.
See How to fix? for Centos:10 relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: validate VAT header length against the VAT inode size
udf_load_vat() takes the virtual partition's start offset straight from the on-disk VAT 2.0 header without checking it against the VAT inode size:
map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset =
le16_to_cpu(vat20->lengthHeader);
map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_num_entries =
(sbi->s_vat_inode->i_size -
map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset) >> 2;
lengthHeader is a fully attacker-controlled 16-bit value. If it exceeds the VAT inode size, the s_num_entries subtraction underflows to a huge count, which defeats the "block > s_num_entries" bound in udf_get_pblock_virt15(); and on the ICB-inline path that function reads
((__le32 *)(iinfo->i_data + s_start_offset))[block]
so a large s_start_offset indexes past the inode's in-ICB data. Mounting a crafted UDF image with a virtual (VAT) partition then triggers an out-of-bounds read.
Reject a VAT whose header length does not leave room for at least one entry within the VAT inode.