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Out-of-bounds Write The advisory has been revoked - it doesn't affect any version of package perf  (opens in a new tab)

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EPSS
0.21% (12th percentile)

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  • Snyk IDSNYK-CENTOS10-PERF-18404806
  • published30 Jul 2026
  • disclosed25 Jul 2026
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Introduced: 25 Jul 2026

NewCVE-2026-64273  (opens in a new tab)
CWE-787  (opens in a new tab)

Amendment

The Centos security team deemed this advisory irrelevant for Centos:10.

NVD Description

Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream perf package and not the perf package as distributed by Centos.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index

iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and using it to address the per-effect state array:

i = data[1] & 0x7f;
if (data[1] & 0x80) {
    if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
                  iforce->core_effects[i].flags))
        ...
} else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
                  iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) {
    ...
}

The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but core_effects[] holds only IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) entries. For an index of 32..127 the test_and_set_bit()/test_and_clear_bit() is an out-of-bounds single-bit read-modify-write past the array. core_effects[] is the second-to-last member of struct iforce, so the write lands in the trailing members and beyond the embedding kzalloc()'d iforce_serio / iforce_usb object.

data[1] is unvalidated device payload on both transports (the USB interrupt endpoint and serio), and the status path is not gated on force feedback being present, so a malicious or counterfeit device can set or clear a bit at an attacker-chosen offset past the object.

Reject an out-of-range index instead of indexing with it. Bound against the array dimension IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX rather than dev->ff->max_effects so the check guarantees memory safety regardless of how many effects the device registered. A legitimate "effect started/stopped" status always carries an index below IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX, so well-formed devices are unaffected; the neighbouring mark_core_as_ready() loop is already bounded and is left untouched.