Out-of-bounds Write Affecting kernel-doc package, versions *


Severity

Recommended
0.0
high
0
10

Based on CentOS security rating.

Threat Intelligence

EPSS
0.14% (5th percentile)

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  • Snyk IDSNYK-CENTOS6-KERNELDOC-18456635
  • published30 Jul 2026
  • disclosed27 Jul 2026

Introduced: 27 Jul 2026

NewCVE-2026-64552  (opens in a new tab)
CWE-787  (opens in a new tab)

How to fix?

There is no fixed version for Centos:6 kernel-doc.

NVD Description

Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel-doc package and not the kernel-doc package as distributed by Centos. See How to fix? for Centos:6 relevant fixed versions and status.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

virtio-net: fix len check in receive_big()

receive_big() bounds the device-announced length by (big_packets_num_skbfrags + 1) * PAGE_SIZE. That is still too loose: add_recvbuf_big() sets sg[1] to start at offset sizeof(struct padded_vnet_hdr) into the first page, so the chain actually carries hdr_len + (PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(padded_vnet_hdr)) + big_packets_num_skbfrags * PAGE_SIZE bytes -- 20 bytes less than the check allows for the common hdr_len == 12 case.

A malicious virtio backend can announce a len in that gap. page_to_skb() then walks one frag past the page chain, storing a NULL page->private into skb_shinfo()->frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS], which is both an out-of-bounds write past the static frag array and a NULL frag handed up the rx path.

Bound len by the size add_recvbuf_big() actually advertised.

CVSS Base Scores

version 3.1