Out-of-bounds Read Affecting python-perf package, versions *


Severity

Recommended
0.0
medium
0
10

Based on CentOS security rating.

Threat Intelligence

EPSS
0.13% (3rd percentile)

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  • Snyk IDSNYK-CENTOS6-PYTHONPERF-17025767
  • published28 May 2026
  • disclosed27 May 2026

Introduced: 27 May 2026

CVE-2026-46064  (opens in a new tab)
CWE-125  (opens in a new tab)

How to fix?

There is no fixed version for Centos:6 python-perf.

NVD Description

Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream python-perf package and not the python-perf package as distributed by Centos. See How to fix? for Centos:6 relevant fixed versions and status.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ibmasm: fix heap over-read in ibmasm_send_i2o_message()

The ibmasm_send_i2o_message() function uses get_dot_command_size() to compute the byte count for memcpy_toio(), but this value is derived from user-controlled fields in the dot_command_header (command_size: u8, data_size: u16) and is never validated against the actual allocation size. A root user can write a small buffer with inflated header fields, causing memcpy_toio() to read up to ~65 KB past the end of the allocation into adjacent kernel heap, which is then forwarded to the service processor over MMIO.

Silently clamping the copy size is not sufficient: if the header fields claim a larger size than the buffer, the SP receives a dot command whose own header is inconsistent with the I2O message length, which can cause the SP to desynchronize. Reject such commands outright by returning failure.

Validate command_size before calling get_mfa_inbound() to avoid leaking an I2O message frame: reading INBOUND_QUEUE_PORT dequeues a hardware frame from the controller's free pool, and returning without a corresponding set_mfa_inbound() call would permanently exhaust it.

Additionally, clamp command_size to I2O_COMMAND_SIZE before the memcpy_toio() so the MMIO write stays within the I2O message frame, consistent with the clamping already performed by outgoing_message_size() for the header field.

CVSS Base Scores

version 3.1