Numeric Range Comparison Without Minimum Check Affecting kernel-debug-modules-internal package, versions *
Threat Intelligence
The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applications- Snyk IDSNYK-CENTOS8-KERNELDEBUGMODULESINTERNAL-20430873
- published4 Oct 2026
- disclosed24 Sept 2026
Introduced: 24 Sep 2026
NewCVE-2026-93228 (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
There is no fixed version for Centos:8 kernel-debug-modules-internal.
NVD Description
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel-debug-modules-internal package and not the kernel-debug-modules-internal package as distributed by Centos.
See How to fix? for Centos:8 relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
svcrdma: Reject Write/Reply chunks with segcount 0
A peer can send a Write or Reply chunk whose segcount field is zero. xdr_check_write_chunk() only rejects segcount > rc_maxpages, so zero passes the range check, and xdr_inline_decode(stream, 0) returns the current (non-NULL) cursor without advancing. The function returns true and pcl_alloc_write() then links a struct svc_rdma_chunk with ch_segcount == 0 onto rc_write_pcl or rc_reply_pcl.
An earlier patch in this series made pcl_for_each_segment() safe for ch_segcount == 0, so this no longer drives the memory walk it used to. Rejecting the malformed frame at the decode boundary is still worthwhile as defense in depth: it keeps degenerate zero-segment chunks off the parsed chunk lists entirely, so any future consumer that walks ch_segments directly cannot observe one, and it makes the zero-floor easy to backport to trees where the macro change is more intrusive. RFC 8166 has no meaning for a Write/Reply chunk that describes no remote buffer, so no legitimate client is affected.
xdr_check_reply_chunk() funnels Reply chunks through xdr_check_write_chunk() and inherits the same rejection.
pcl_alloc_write() also links each chunk onto the parsed chunk list before filling its segment array. If a future change weakens the segcount-0 rejection, an incomplete chunk is visible to consumers during the fill loop. Reorder so that list_add_tail() follows the segment fill loop, ensuring only fully-populated chunks appear on the list.
References
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-93228
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/45dbdb2637b7fc5f1355b588780d2a7fb0516805
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9808eb7656666acc7291bae9ab6b987bd16e47e0
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a798714b58041e88716db3bf8fb03ae13eecd54a
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fe533ae1bed2ef2b3d54ee7ab410da1874ed3d4f