Improper Input Validation Affecting kernel-modules-extra package, versions <0:4.18.0-553.16.1.el8_10
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Start learning- Snyk IDSNYK-CENTOS8-KERNELMODULESEXTRA-7043536
- published23 May 2024
- disclosed21 May 2024
Introduced: 21 May 2024
CVE-2023-52775 (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
Upgrade Centos:8 kernel-modules-extra to version 0:4.18.0-553.16.1.el8_10 or higher.
NVD Description
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel-modules-extra package and not the kernel-modules-extra package as distributed by Centos.
See How to fix? for Centos:8 relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: avoid data corruption caused by decline
We found a data corruption issue during testing of SMC-R on Redis applications.
The benchmark has a low probability of reporting a strange error as shown below.
"Error: Protocol error, got "\xe2" as reply type byte"
Finally, we found that the retrieved error data was as follows:
0xE2 0xD4 0xC3 0xD9 0x04 0x00 0x2C 0x20 0xA6 0x56 0x00 0x16 0x3E 0x0C 0xCB 0x04 0x02 0x01 0x00 0x00 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0xE2
It is quite obvious that this is a SMC DECLINE message, which means that the applications received SMC protocol message. We found that this was caused by the following situations:
client server ¦ clc proposal -------------> ¦ clc accept <------------- ¦ clc confirm -------------> wait llc confirm send llc confirm ¦failed llc confirm ¦ x------ (after 2s)timeout wait llc confirm rsp
wait decline
(after 1s) timeout (after 2s) timeout ¦ decline --------------> ¦ decline <--------------
As a result, a decline message was sent in the implementation, and this message was read from TCP by the already-fallback connection.
This patch double the client timeout as 2x of the server value, With this simple change, the Decline messages should never cross or collide (during Confirm link timeout).
This issue requires an immediate solution, since the protocol updates involve a more long-term solution.
References
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2023-52775
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ada292b5c504720a0acef8cae9acc62a694d19c
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7234d2b5dffa5af77fd4e0deaebab509e130c6b1
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/90072af9efe8c7bd7d086709014ddd44cebd5e7c
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/94a0ae698b4d5d5bb598e23228002a1491c50add
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e6d71b437abc2f249e3b6a1ae1a7228e09c6e563