Improper Input Validation Affecting kernel-rt-debug-kvm package, versions *


Severity

Recommended
0.0
medium
0
10

Based on CentOS security rating

    Threat Intelligence

    EPSS
    0.04% (11th percentile)

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  • Snyk ID SNYK-CENTOS8-KERNELRTDEBUGKVM-6399255
  • published 6 Mar 2024
  • disclosed 4 Mar 2024

How to fix?

There is no fixed version for Centos:8 kernel-rt-debug-kvm.

NVD Description

Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel-rt-debug-kvm package and not the kernel-rt-debug-kvm package as distributed by Centos. See How to fix? for Centos:8 relevant fixed versions and status.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

KVM: VMX: Always clear vmx->fail on emulation_required

Revert a relatively recent change that set vmx->fail if the vCPU is in L2 and emulation_required is true, as that behavior is completely bogus. Setting vmx->fail and synthesizing a VM-Exit is contradictory and wrong:

(a) it's impossible to have both a VM-Fail and VM-Exit (b) vmcs.EXIT_REASON is not modified on VM-Fail (c) emulation_required refers to guest state and guest state checks are always VM-Exits, not VM-Fails.

For KVM specifically, emulation_required is handled before nested exits in __vmx_handle_exit(), thus setting vmx->fail has no immediate effect, i.e. KVM calls into handle_invalid_guest_state() and vmx->fail is ignored. Setting vmx->fail can ultimately result in a WARN in nested_vmx_vmexit() firing when tearing down the VM as KVM never expects vmx->fail to be set when L2 is active, KVM always reflects those errors into L1.

------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 21158 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:4548 nested_vmx_vmexit+0x16bd/0x17e0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:4547 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 21158 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:nested_vmx_vmexit+0x16bd/0x17e0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:4547 Code: <0f> 0b e9 2e f8 ff ff e8 57 b3 5d 00 0f 0b e9 00 f1 ff ff 89 e9 80 Call Trace: vmx_leave_nested arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:6220 [inline] nested_vmx_free_vcpu+0x83/0xc0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:330 vmx_free_vcpu+0x11f/0x2a0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6799 kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy+0x6b/0x240 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:10989 kvm_vcpu_destroy+0x29/0x90 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:441 kvm_free_vcpus arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11426 [inline] kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x3ef/0x6b0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11545 kvm_destroy_vm arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1189 [inline] kvm_put_kvm+0x751/0xe40 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1220 kvm_vcpu_release+0x53/0x60 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3489 __fput+0x3fc/0x870 fs/file_table.c:280 task_work_run+0x146/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:164 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:32 [inline] do_exit+0x705/0x24f0 kernel/exit.c:832 do_group_exit+0x168/0x2d0 kernel/exit.c:929 get_signal+0x1740/0x2120 kernel/signal.c:2852 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x9c/0x730 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:868 handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:148 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:172 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x191/0x220 kernel/entry/common.c:207 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:289 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x2e/0x70 kernel/entry/common.c:300 do_syscall_64+0x53/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

CVSS Scores

version 3.1
Expand this section

Red Hat

5.5 medium
  • Attack Vector (AV)
    Local
  • Attack Complexity (AC)
    Low
  • Privileges Required (PR)
    Low
  • User Interaction (UI)
    None
  • Scope (S)
    Unchanged
  • Confidentiality (C)
    None
  • Integrity (I)
    None
  • Availability (A)
    High