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Start learningThere is no fixed version for Centos:9 kernel-rt-debug.
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel-rt-debug package and not the kernel-rt-debug package as distributed by Centos.
See How to fix? for Centos:9 relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix undefined behavior in interpreter sdiv/smod for INT_MIN
The BPF interpreter's signed 32-bit division and modulo handlers use the kernel abs() macro on s32 operands. The abs() macro documentation (include/linux/math.h) explicitly states the result is undefined when the input is the type minimum. When DST contains S32_MIN (0x80000000), abs((s32)DST) triggers undefined behavior and returns S32_MIN unchanged on arm64/x86. This value is then sign-extended to u64 as 0xFFFFFFFF80000000, causing do_div() to compute the wrong result.
The verifier's abstract interpretation (scalar32_min_max_sdiv) computes the mathematically correct result for range tracking, creating a verifier/interpreter mismatch that can be exploited for out-of-bounds map value access.
Introduce abs_s32() which handles S32_MIN correctly by casting to u32 before negating, avoiding signed overflow entirely. Replace all 8 abs((s32)...) call sites in the interpreter's sdiv32/smod32 handlers.
s32 is the only affected case -- the s64 division/modulo handlers do not use abs().