The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applicationsThere is no fixed version for Centos:9
kernel-rt-debug-modules-core
.
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel-rt-debug-modules-core
package and not the kernel-rt-debug-modules-core
package as distributed by Centos
.
See How to fix?
for Centos:9
relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/psi: Fix use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue()
If a non-root cgroup gets removed when there is a thread that registered trigger and is polling on a pressure file within the cgroup, the polling waitqueue gets freed in the following path:
do_rmdir cgroup_rmdir kernfs_drain_open_files cgroup_file_release cgroup_pressure_release psi_trigger_destroy
However, the polling thread still has a reference to the pressure file and will access the freed waitqueue when the file is closed or upon exit:
fput ep_eventpoll_release ep_free ep_remove_wait_queue remove_wait_queue
This results in use-after-free as pasted below.
The fundamental problem here is that cgroup_file_release() (and consequently waitqueue's lifetime) is not tied to the file's real lifetime. Using wake_up_pollfree() here might be less than ideal, but it is in line with the comment at commit 42288cb44c4b ("wait: add wake_up_pollfree()") since the waitqueue's lifetime is not tied to file's one and can be considered as another special case. While this would be fixable by somehow making cgroup_file_release() be tied to the fput(), it would require sizable refactoring at cgroups or higher layer which might be more justifiable if we identify more cases like this.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x60/0xc0 Write of size 4 at addr ffff88810e625328 by task a.out/4404
CPU: 19 PID: 4404 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.2.0-rc6 #38
Hardware name: Amazon EC2 c5a.8xlarge/, BIOS 1.0 10/16/2017
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0xa0
print_report+0x16c/0x4e0
kasan_report+0xc3/0xf0
kasan_check_range+0x2d2/0x310
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x60/0xc0
remove_wait_queue+0x1a/0xa0
ep_free+0x12c/0x170
ep_eventpoll_release+0x26/0x30
__fput+0x202/0x400
task_work_run+0x11d/0x170
do_exit+0x495/0x1130
do_group_exit+0x100/0x100
get_signal+0xd67/0xde0
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x2a/0x2b0
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x94/0x100
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x20/0x40
do_syscall_64+0x52/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
</TASK>
Allocated by task 4404:
kasan_set_track+0x3d/0x60
__kasan_kmalloc+0x85/0x90
psi_trigger_create+0x113/0x3e0
pressure_write+0x146/0x2e0
cgroup_file_write+0x11c/0x250
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x186/0x220
vfs_write+0x3d8/0x5c0
ksys_write+0x90/0x110
do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Freed by task 4407:
kasan_set_track+0x3d/0x60
kasan_save_free_info+0x27/0x40
____kasan_slab_free+0x11d/0x170
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x87/0x150
__kmem_cache_free+0xcb/0x180
psi_trigger_destroy+0x2e8/0x310
cgroup_file_release+0x4f/0xb0
kernfs_drain_open_files+0x165/0x1f0
kernfs_drain+0x162/0x1a0
__kernfs_remove+0x1fb/0x310
kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x95/0xe0
cgroup_addrm_files+0x67f/0x700
cgroup_destroy_locked+0x283/0x3c0
cgroup_rmdir+0x29/0x100
kernfs_iop_rmdir+0xd1/0x140
vfs_rmdir+0xfe/0x240
do_rmdir+0x13d/0x280
__x64_sys_rmdir+0x2c/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd