The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applicationsUpgrade Chainguard
cargo-c
to version 0.10.4-r0 or higher.
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream cargo-c
package and not the cargo-c
package as distributed by Chainguard
.
See How to fix?
for Chainguard
relevant fixed versions and status.
gix-path
is a crate of the gitoxide
project (an implementation of git
written in Rust) dealing paths and their conversions. Prior to version 0.10.11, gix-path
runs git
to find the path of a configuration file associated with the git
installation, but improperly resolves paths containing unusual or non-ASCII characters, in rare cases enabling a local attacker to inject configuration leading to code execution. Version 0.10.11 contains a patch for the issue.
In gix_path::env
, the underlying implementation of the installation_config
and installation_config_prefix
functions calls git config -l --show-origin
to find the path of a file to treat as belonging to the git
installation. Affected versions of gix-path
do not pass -z
/--null
to cause git
to report literal paths. Instead, to cover the occasional case that git
outputs a quoted path, they attempt to parse the path by stripping the quotation marks. The problem is that, when a path is quoted, it may change in substantial ways beyond the concatenation of quotation marks. If not reversed, these changes can result in another valid path that is not equivalent to the original.
On a single-user system, it is not possible to exploit this, unless GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM
and GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL
have been set to unusual values or Git has been installed in an unusual way. Such a scenario is not expected. Exploitation is unlikely even on a multi-user system, though it is plausible in some uncommon configurations or use cases. In general, exploitation is more likely to succeed if users are expected to install git
themselves, and are likely to do so in predictable locations; locations where git
is installed, whether due to usernames in their paths or otherwise, contain characters that git
quotes by default in paths, such as non-English letters and accented letters; a custom system
-scope configuration file is specified with the GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM
environment variable, and its path is in an unusual location or has strangely named components; or a system
-scope configuration file is absent, empty, or suppressed by means other than GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM
. Currently, gix-path
can treat a global
-scope configuration file as belonging to the installation if no higher scope configuration file is available. This increases the likelihood of exploitation even on a system where git
is installed system-wide in an ordinary way. However, exploitation is expected to be very difficult even under any combination of those factors.