CVE-2024-45310 Affecting ingress-nginx-controller-fips-1.10 package, versions <1.10.4-r1
Threat Intelligence
The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applications- Snyk IDSNYK-CHAINGUARDLATEST-INGRESSNGINXCONTROLLERFIPS110-7896400
- published4 Sept 2024
- disclosed3 Sept 2024
Introduced: 3 Sep 2024
CVE-2024-45310 (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
Upgrade Chainguard ingress-nginx-controller-fips-1.10 to version 1.10.4-r1 or higher.
NVD Description
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream ingress-nginx-controller-fips-1.10 package and not the ingress-nginx-controller-fips-1.10 package as distributed by Chainguard.
See How to fix? for Chainguard relevant fixed versions and status.
runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. runc 1.1.13 and earlier, as well as 1.2.0-rc2 and earlier, can be tricked into creating empty files or directories in arbitrary locations in the host filesystem by sharing a volume between two containers and exploiting a race with os.MkdirAll. While this could be used to create empty files, existing files would not be truncated. An attacker must have the ability to start containers using some kind of custom volume configuration. Containers using user namespaces are still affected, but the scope of places an attacker can create inodes can be significantly reduced. Sufficiently strict LSM policies (SELinux/Apparmor) can also in principle block this attack -- we suspect the industry standard SELinux policy may restrict this attack's scope but the exact scope of protection hasn't been analysed. This is exploitable using runc directly as well as through Docker and Kubernetes. The issue is fixed in runc v1.1.14 and v1.2.0-rc3.
Some workarounds are available. Using user namespaces restricts this attack fairly significantly such that the attacker can only create inodes in directories that the remapped root user/group has write access to. Unless the root user is remapped to an actual
user on the host (such as with rootless containers that don't use /etc/sub[ug]id), this in practice means that an attacker would only be able to create inodes in world-writable directories. A strict enough SELinux or AppArmor policy could in principle also restrict the scope if a specific label is applied to the runc runtime, though neither the extent to which the standard existing policies block this attack nor what exact policies are needed to sufficiently restrict this attack have been thoroughly tested.
References
- https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/63c2908164f3a1daea455bf5bcd8d363d70328c7
- https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/8781993968fd964ac723ff5f360b6f259e809a3e
- https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/f0b652ea61ff6750a8fcc69865d45a7abf37accf
- https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/pull/4359
- https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-jfvp-7x6p-h2pv
- http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/09/03/1