Out-of-bounds Write Affecting linux-qemu-rc package, versions <7.1_rc3-r0

Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream linux-qemu-rc package and not the linux-qemu-rc package as distributed by Chainguard. See How to fix? for Chainguard relevant fixed versions and status.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: validate response sizes in ipc_validate_msg()

ipc_validate_msg() computes the expected message size for each response type by adding (or multiplying) attacker-controlled fields from the daemon response to a fixed struct size in unsigned int arithmetic. Three cases can overflow:

KSMBD_EVENT_RPC_REQUEST: msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_rpc_command) + resp->payload_sz; KSMBD_EVENT_SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST: msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_share_config_response) + resp->payload_sz; KSMBD_EVENT_LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT: msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_login_response_ext) + resp->ngroups * sizeof(gid_t);

resp->payload_sz is __u32 and resp->ngroups is __s32. Each addition can wrap in unsigned int; the multiplication by sizeof(gid_t) mixes signed and size_t, so a negative ngroups is converted to SIZE_MAX before the multiply. A wrapped value of msg_sz that happens to equal entry->msg_sz bypasses the size check on the next line, and downstream consumers (smb2pdu.c:6742 memcpy using rpc_resp->payload_sz, kmemdup in ksmbd_alloc_user using resp_ext->ngroups) then trust the unverified length.

Use check_add_overflow() on the RPC_REQUEST and SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST paths to detect integer overflow without constraining functional payload size; userspace ksmbd-tools grows NDR responses in 4096-byte chunks for calls like NetShareEnumAll, so a hard transport cap is unworkable on the response side. For LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT, reject resp->ngroups outside the signed [0, NGROUPS_MAX] range up front and report the error from ipc_validate_msg() so it fires at the IPC boundary; with that bound the subsequent multiplication and addition stay well below UINT_MAX. The now-redundant ngroups check and pr_err in ksmbd_alloc_user() are removed.

This is the response-side analogue of aab98e2dbd64 ("ksmbd: fix integer overflows on 32 bit systems"), which hardened the request side.

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/299db777ea0cfa5c407e41b045c24a14c034c27b
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7dd0c858e1909769a4c91842724315ee74f1a5f1
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99c631d0366c1eab8fb188fe66425f4581ebdde4
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d6a6aa81eac2c9bff66dc6e191179cb69a14426b