Arbitrary Code Injection The advisory has been revoked - it doesn't affect any version of package tritonserver-backend-tensorrtllm-24.04  (opens in a new tab)

The Chainguard security team deemed this advisory irrelevant for Chainguard:latest.

Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream tritonserver-backend-tensorrtllm-24.04 package and not the tritonserver-backend-tensorrtllm-24.04 package as distributed by Chainguard.

Diffusers is the a library for pretrained diffusion models. Prior to 0.38.0, a trust_remote_code bypass in DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained allows arbitrary remote code execution despite the user passing trust_remote_code=False (or omitting it, which is the default). The vulnerability has three variants, all sharing the same root cause — the trust_remote_code gate was implemented inside DiffusionPipeline.download() rather than at the actual dynamic-module load site, so any code path that bypassed or short-circuited download() also bypassed the security check. DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained('repoA', custom_pipeline='attacker/repoB', trust_remote_code=False) — the gate evaluated against repoA's file list rather than repoB's, so repoB's pipeline.py was loaded and executed. DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained('/local/snapshot', custom_pipeline='attacker/repoB', trust_remote_code=False) — the local-path branch never invoked download(), so the gate was never reached and remote code from repoB executed. DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained('/local/snapshot', trust_remote_code=False) where the snapshot contains custom component files (e.g. unet/my_unet_model.py) referenced from model_index.json — same root cause; the local path skipped download() and custom component code executed. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.38.0.

• https://github.com/huggingface/diffusers/security/advisories/GHSA-98h9-4798-4q5v