CVE-2026-90092 Affecting linux-6.12 package, versions <6.12.111-1~deb12u1
Threat Intelligence
The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applications- Snyk IDSNYK-DEBIAN12-LINUX612-20506358
- published5 Oct 2026
- disclosed17 Sept 2026
Introduced: 17 Sep 2026
NewCVE-2026-90092 (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
Upgrade Debian:12 linux-6.12 to version 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 or higher.
NVD Description
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream linux-6.12 package and not the linux-6.12 package as distributed by Debian.
See How to fix? for Debian:12 relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: reject accept queue add unless BT_LISTEN
New sk should not be added to parent socket accept queue after last l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() has run in l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() and state set to BT_CLOSED, as that can result to UAF on dereferencing the dangling parent reference.
l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb() may race with parent l2cap_chan teardown, due to chan->state accessed without consistent locking:
[Task 1] [Task 2] l2cap_sock_release(parent) l2cap_connect l2cap_sock_shutdown pchan = l2cap_global_chan_by_psm l2cap_chan_lock(pchan) l2cap_chan_close l2cap_sock_teardown_cb pchan->state = BT_CLOSED l2cap_chan_unlock(pchan) ------> l2cap_chan_lock(pchan) l2cap_new_connection l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb l2cap_chan_lock(pchan) <-------- l2cap_chan_unlock(pchan) l2cap_sock_kill(parent) /* bt_sk(sk)->parent dangling */
Fix by adding check for sk_state == BT_LISTEN after acquiring sk lock in l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb(). Add lock_sock() around sk_state writes where missing, to avoid data races.
Although the data races on pchan->state should be fixed too, this defensive sk_state check probably makes sense in any case.
References
- https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-90092
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a3a27aaf19bf069720e024ce6fde54e6bf80df9
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/491e4c60017969b053888029998d2a61f298986a
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/87276dc15b559d32757a43b4415c8445fbae06c4
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf61a65c6093970e3b50031c4b79ebf3bd411eba
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c47339e169bf4a0a4cfabb91351471f67744c2bc
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d4bfa78fd67929b62b02013c107973e0c5b7aa9a