The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
In a few clicks we can analyze your entire application and see what components are vulnerable in your application, and suggest you quick fixes.
Test your applicationsUpgrade Debian:12 linux-6.12 to version 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 or higher.
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream linux-6.12 package and not the linux-6.12 package as distributed by Debian.
See How to fix? for Debian:12 relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: reject out-of-range evcn in mi_enum_attr()
In mi_enum_attr(), the start/end VCN validation for non-resident attributes is:
if (svcn > evcn + 1) goto out;
When evcn is U64_MAX the "evcn + 1" expression wraps to 0 and any svcn passes the check. For evcn values close to U64_MAX (but not equal to it) the right-hand side is still a meaningless near-wrap upper bound, so a malformed on-disk attribute with svcn == 0 and evcn near U64_MAX can pass mi_enum_attr() unrejected.
VCN (virtual cluster number) is a cluster index, so any valid evcn is bounded by the volume's total cluster count, which ntfs3 holds in sbi->used.bitmap.nbits (set up in ntfs_init_from_boot() before any caller of mi_enum_attr() runs). Reject evcn values that fall outside this range.
However, an empty non-resident attribute (no allocated clusters) is legitimately encoded with svcn == 0 and evcn == -1 (U64_MAX), e.g. via attr->nres.evcn = cpu_to_le64((u64)vcn - 1) with vcn == 0. That sentinel must keep passing, so exclude evcn == U64_MAX from the range check. The existing "svcn > evcn + 1" test still tolerates the sentinel ("0 > 0" is false) and continues to require svcn == 0 for it, while the range check rejects every other out-of-range evcn and thereby also defuses the "evcn + 1" wraparound.
svcn does not need its own bound: once evcn < nbits, "svcn > evcn + 1" implies svcn <= nbits.
[almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: fixed evcn check]