Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Affecting php-guzzlehttp-psr7 package, versions <2.7.1-1+deb13u1

Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream php-guzzlehttp-psr7 package and not the php-guzzlehttp-psr7 package as distributed by Debian. See How to fix? for Debian:13 relevant fixed versions and status.

guzzlehttp/psr7 is a PSR-7 HTTP message library implementation in PHP. Versions prior to 2.10.2 contain improper Host header validation when parsing raw HTTP request messages and when deriving a server request URI from server variables. An attacker can provide a malformed Host header containing URI authority delimiters, such as trusted.example@evil.example. When the Host value is used to construct a URI, the malformed value can be reinterpreted as URI userinfo and host. This can cause the PSR-7 request URI host to differ from the original Host header value. Applications are affected if they parse attacker-controlled raw HTTP requests with GuzzleHttp\Psr7\Message::parseRequest() or the legacy 1.x GuzzleHttp\Psr7\parse_request() function, or if they build server requests from attacker-controlled server variables, then rely on the resulting URI host for routing, allow-list checks, or forwarding decisions. In affected forwarding or gateway scenarios, this may cause requests or credentials to be sent to an unintended host. The issue is patched in 2.10.2. 1.x is end-of-life and will not receive a patch. Some workarounds are available. Validate the Host header as uri-host [ ":" port ] before calling Message::parseRequest() or legacy parse_request() on untrusted HTTP request data, or before deriving routing and forwarding decisions from a parsed request URI. Reject Host values containing userinfo, path, query, or fragment delimiters.

• https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-48998
• https://github.com/guzzle/psr7/security/advisories/GHSA-34xg-wgjx-8xph