CVE-2026-65625 Affecting erlang-jose package, versions *


Severity

Recommended
low

Based on default assessment until relevant scores are available.

Threat Intelligence

EPSS
0.12% (2nd percentile)

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  • Snyk IDSNYK-DEBIANUNSTABLE-ERLANGJOSE-21757304
  • published28 Oct 2026
  • disclosed26 Oct 2026

Introduced: 26 Oct 2026

NewCVE-2026-65625  (opens in a new tab)

How to fix?

There is no fixed version for Debian:unstable erlang-jose.

NVD Description

Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream erlang-jose package and not the erlang-jose package as distributed by Debian. See How to fix? for Debian:unstable relevant fixed versions and status.

The pure-Erlang AES-GCM fallback in jose_jwa_aes derives the number of verified authentication tag bits from the attacker-supplied tag itself. In the {aes_gcm, Bits} clause of block_decrypt/4, the incoming tag is guarded only by is_binary/1, with no check on its length. Verification in gcm_block_decrypt/6 then computes TBits = bit_size(T) and compares only those bits of the real 128-bit tag. An attacker who controls a JWE token can truncate the authentication tag to as little as 8 bits, so only 8 bits are ever checked. This reduces forgery resistance from 2^-128 to 2^-8, and a forged ciphertext is reliably accepted as authentic within 256 attempts without knowledge of the key (an authentication tag forgery and integrity bypass). Supplying a tag longer than 128 bits instead causes a badmatch that crashes the decrypting process. The fallback is reached through the public JWE decryption path whenever AES-GCM is not provided by a native crypto NIF, for example on FIPS or stripped or older OTP builds.

This issue affects jose: from 1.2.0 before 1.11.13.