Comparison Using Wrong Factors Affecting blazar package, versions *


Severity

Recommended
low

Based on default assessment until relevant scores are available.

Threat Intelligence

EPSS
0.24% (16th percentile)

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  • Snyk IDSNYK-ECHOLATEST-BLAZAR-19946129
  • published19 Sept 2026
  • disclosed18 Sept 2026

Introduced: 18 Sep 2026

NewCVE-2026-93854  (opens in a new tab)
CWE-1025  (opens in a new tab)

How to fix?

There is no fixed version for Echo:latest blazar.

NVD Description

Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream blazar package and not the blazar package as distributed by Echo. See How to fix? for Echo:latest relevant fixed versions and status.

In OpenStack Blazar before 17.0.1, the V2 lease API does not enforce object-level authorization on its update and delete operations (PUT /v2/leases/{lease_id} and DELETE /v2/leases/{lease_id}). The policy authorize() wrapper attempts to load the target lease to build the authorization target from its owner, but it looks up the lease under the keyword "lease_id" whereas the controller methods name the parameter "id" (and the wsme_pecan.wsexpose wrapper delivers it positionally). The lookup returns None, and thus authorization falls back to the requesting user's own project_id/user_id instead of the target lease owner. Any authenticated user who knows a lease ID can therefore modify or delete leases belonging to other users and projects, bypassing the intended ownership check.