CRLF Injection Affecting netty package, versions *


Severity

Recommended
low

Based on default assessment until relevant scores are available.

Threat Intelligence

EPSS
0.11% (2nd percentile)

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  • Snyk IDSNYK-ECHOLATEST-NETTY-18426992
  • published30 Jul 2026
  • disclosed29 Jul 2026

Introduced: 29 Jul 2026

NewCVE-2026-59919  (opens in a new tab)
CWE-93  (opens in a new tab)

How to fix?

There is no fixed version for Echo:latest netty.

NVD Description

Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream netty package and not the netty package as distributed by Echo. See How to fix? for Echo:latest relevant fixed versions and status.

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. In versions prior to 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, Netty's HAProxy encoder ( HAProxyMessageEncoder ) writes AF_UNIX source and destination socket addresses into the HAProxy V1 text protocol without validating them for CRLF characters, so an attacker who controls an AF_UNIX address can inject  \r\n  sequences and split the single PROXY header into multiple lines. This is possible because the V1 protocol uses CRLF as its line terminator and, unlike IPv4/IPv6 addresses whose format checks implicitly reject CRLF, AF_UNIX addresses are only validated for length (up to 108 bytes), allowing a forged second PROXY header line that spoofs the client source/destination IP to a downstream server or load balancer. The issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.

CVSS Base Scores

version 3.1