Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution') Affecting cal.diy-6.2 package, versions *


Severity

Recommended
low

Based on default assessment until relevant scores are available.

Threat Intelligence

EPSS
0.66% (50th percentile)

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  • Snyk IDSNYK-MINIMOSLATEST-CALDIY62-17690555
  • published30 Jun 2026
  • disclosed15 Jun 2026

Introduced: 15 Jun 2026

CVE-2026-48713  (opens in a new tab)
CWE-1321  (opens in a new tab)

How to fix?

There is no fixed version for Minimos:latest cal.diy-6.2.

NVD Description

Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream cal.diy-6.2 package and not the cal.diy-6.2 package as distributed by Minimos. See How to fix? for Minimos:latest relevant fixed versions and status.

Versions prior to 2.6.6 are vulnerable to prototype pollution via crafted missing-key strings when used to persist missing translation keys (e.g. via i18next-http-middleware's missingKeyHandler exposed to untrusted input). Backend.writeFile() splits each queued missing-key string on the configured keySeparator (default .) before calling the internal setPath() walker. The walker (getLastOfPath in lib/utils.js) did not guard against unsafe segments, so a key like "proto.polluted" was split into ["proto", "polluted"] and walked straight into Object.prototype, allowing an attacker to write arbitrary properties onto the global object prototype. Depending on the host application, polluted prototype properties may cause crashes, corrupted translation behaviour, configuration poisoning, or bypasses of property-based security checks. Applications are affected only if the missingKeyHandler (or another route that forwards untrusted request bodies to i18next.t(..., { ... }) with saveMissing: true) is reachable by untrusted users and the default behaviour of splitting missing-key strings on keySeparator is in use (i.e. keySeparator is not false). Apps that do not expose missing-key persistence to untrusted input are not directly affected through this attack path. This issue has been fixed in version 2.6.6. If developers using the library are unable to upgrade immediately, they should take the following precautions: do not expose i18next-http-middleware's missingKeyHandler to untrusted users (mount it behind authentication, or remove the route), disable missing-key persistence (saveMissing: false, or no backend.create implementation) when accepting writes from untrusted input, and set keySeparator: false in their i18next options to disable backend key splitting (note: this also disables nested translation keys).