CRLF Injection Affecting keycloak-advanced-compat package, versions *
Threat Intelligence
The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applications- Snyk IDSNYK-MINIMOSLATEST-KEYCLOAKADVANCEDCOMPAT-16439179
- published7 May 2026
- disclosed6 May 2026
Introduced: 6 May 2026
NewCVE-2026-41417 (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
There is no fixed version for Minimos:latest keycloak-advanced-compat.
NVD Description
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream keycloak-advanced-compat package and not the keycloak-advanced-compat package as distributed by Minimos.
See How to fix? for Minimos:latest relevant fixed versions and status.
Netty allows request-line validation to be bypassed when a DefaultHttpRequest or DefaultFullHttpRequest is created first and its URI is later changed via setUri(). The constructors reject CRLF and whitespace characters that would break the start-line, but setUri() does not apply the same validation. HttpRequestEncoder and RtspEncoder then write the URI into the request line verbatim. If attacker-controlled input reaches setUri(), this enables CRLF injection and insertion of additional HTTP or RTSP requests, leading to HTTP request smuggling or desynchronization on the HTTP side and request injection on the RTSP side. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.