Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key Affecting seaweedfs package, versions <4.40-r0


Severity

Recommended
low

Based on default assessment until relevant scores are available.

Threat Intelligence

EPSS
0.38% (30th percentile)

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  • Snyk IDSNYK-MINIMOSLATEST-SEAWEEDFS-19504434
  • published3 Sept 2026
  • disclosed26 Aug 2026

Introduced: 26 Aug 2026

CVE-2026-77368  (opens in a new tab)
CWE-639  (opens in a new tab)

How to fix?

Upgrade Minimos:latest seaweedfs to version 4.40-r0 or higher.

NVD Description

Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream seaweedfs package and not the seaweedfs package as distributed by Minimos. See How to fix? for Minimos:latest relevant fixed versions and status.

SeaweedFS is a distributed storage system for files and blobs. In version 4.39, the filer's TUS resumable-upload handler checks JWT allowed_prefixes scoping only when a session is created, letting a low-privilege tenant hijack another tenant's upload session to write content to filer paths their own token forbids. The HEAD, PATCH, and DELETE verbs that act on an existing session by its id never verify that the session's stored target path falls within the caller's allowed prefixes, so a tenant who obtains another upload's session identifier can PATCH attacker bytes into it and, on completion, have the file land at the victim's out-of-scope path. The same token can also DELETE other tenants' sessions and HEAD them to read upload progress and size, defeating the JWT prefix isolation. This vulnerability only affects deployments that configure filer JWT signing and have TUS uploads enabled. This issue is fixed in version 4.40.