The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applicationsUpgrade Oracle:10 kernel-uek-debug-modules-extra to version 0:6.12.0-206.104.3.3.el10uek or higher.
This issue was patched in ELSA-2026-500248.
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel-uek-debug-modules-extra package and not the kernel-uek-debug-modules-extra package as distributed by Oracle.
See How to fix? for Oracle:10 relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio-net: fix len check in receive_big()
receive_big() bounds the device-announced length by (big_packets_num_skbfrags + 1) * PAGE_SIZE. That is still too loose: add_recvbuf_big() sets sg[1] to start at offset sizeof(struct padded_vnet_hdr) into the first page, so the chain actually carries hdr_len + (PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(padded_vnet_hdr)) + big_packets_num_skbfrags * PAGE_SIZE bytes -- 20 bytes less than the check allows for the common hdr_len == 12 case.
A malicious virtio backend can announce a len in that gap. page_to_skb() then walks one frag past the page chain, storing a NULL page->private into skb_shinfo()->frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS], which is both an out-of-bounds write past the static frag array and a NULL frag handed up the rx path.
Bound len by the size add_recvbuf_big() actually advertised.