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CVE-2026-80731 Affecting kernel-uek-modules package, versions <0:5.15.0-324.217.5.2.el8uek

Severity

 Recommended
high

Based on Oracle Linux security rating.

Threat Intelligence

EPSS
0.18% (8th percentile)

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  • Snyk IDSNYK-ORACLE8-KERNELUEKMODULES-19557728
  • published5 Sept 2026
  • disclosed3 Sept 2026
Report a new vulnerability Found a mistake?

Introduced: 3 Sep 2026

NewCVE-2026-80731  (opens in a new tab)

How to fix?

Upgrade Oracle:8 kernel-uek-modules to version 0:5.15.0-324.217.5.2.el8uek or higher.
This issue was patched in ELSA-2026-500249.

NVD Description

Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel-uek-modules package and not the kernel-uek-modules package as distributed by Oracle. See How to fix? for Oracle:8 relevant fixed versions and status.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: remove CAP_SYS_RAWIO zero-padding in dev_validate_header

dev_validate_header() reads dev->hard_header_len directly when zero-padding short link layer headers for CAP_SYS_RAWIO holders:

if (capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) {
    memset(ll_header + len, 0, dev-&gt;hard_header_len - len);
    return true;
}

Packet send paths call dev_validate_header() on skbs whose headroom was allocated from an earlier hard_header_len read. If the device is reconfigured so that dev->hard_header_len increases before validation, the memset writes past the reserved buffer, an out-of-bounds write.

This out-of-bounds write is masked in some SOCK_RAW paths today because the same concurrent increase can first make skb_push() exceed the reserved headroom and trigger skb_under_panic(). Remove the zero-padding branch before making those hard_header_len reads consistent, so the snapshot fixes do not turn a loud panic into a silent overwrite.

This path is only reached for variable length L2 protocols, where len < hard_header_len but len >= min_header_len. No remaining in-tree variable length L2 protocol implements header_ops->validate, and the CAP_SYS_RAWIO bypass that zero-pads and accepts short headers has no real value beyond allowing testing of intentionally malformed input.

Drop the CAP_SYS_RAWIO branch. The remaining reads of dev->hard_header_len in dev_validate_header() are comparisons only and have no memory safety impact.