CVE-2025-71160 Affecting kernel-uek-doc package, versions <0:6.12.0-109.67.6.el9uek
Threat Intelligence
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Test your applications- Snyk IDSNYK-ORACLE9-KERNELUEKDOC-15469747
- published12 Mar 2026
- disclosed23 Jan 2026
Introduced: 23 Jan 2026
CVE-2025-71160 (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
Upgrade Oracle:9 kernel-uek-doc to version 0:6.12.0-109.67.6.el9uek or higher.
This issue was patched in ELSA-2026-50144.
NVD Description
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel-uek-doc package and not the kernel-uek-doc package as distributed by Oracle.
See How to fix? for Oracle:9 relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: avoid chain re-validation if possible
Hamza Mahfooz reports cpu soft lock-ups in nft_chain_validate():
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 27s! [iptables-nft-re:37547] [..] RIP: 0010:nft_chain_validate+0xcb/0x110 [nf_tables] [..] nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables] nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables] nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables] nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables] nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables] nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables] nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables] nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables] nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables] nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables] nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables] nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables] nft_table_validate+0x6b/0xb0 [nf_tables] nf_tables_validate+0x8b/0xa0 [nf_tables] nf_tables_commit+0x1df/0x1eb0 [nf_tables] [..]
Currently nf_tables will traverse the entire table (chain graph), starting from the entry points (base chains), exploring all possible paths (chain jumps). But there are cases where we could avoid revalidation.
Consider: 1 input -> j2 -> j3 2 input -> j2 -> j3 3 input -> j1 -> j2 -> j3
Then the second rule does not need to revalidate j2, and, by extension j3, because this was already checked during validation of the first rule. We need to validate it only for rule 3.
This is needed because chain loop detection also ensures we do not exceed the jump stack: Just because we know that j2 is cycle free, its last jump might now exceed the allowed stack size. We also need to update all reachable chains with the new largest observed call depth.
Care has to be taken to revalidate even if the chain depth won't be an issue: chain validation also ensures that expressions are not called from invalid base chains. For example, the masquerade expression can only be called from NAT postrouting base chains.
Therefore we also need to keep record of the base chain context (type, hooknum) and revalidate if the chain becomes reachable from a different hook location.
References
- https://linux.oracle.com/cve/CVE-2025-71160.html
- https://linux.oracle.com/errata/ELSA-2026-50144.html
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/09d6074995c186e449979fe6c1b0f1a69cf9bd3b
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/14fa3d1927f1382f86e3f70a51f26005c8e3cff6
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/53de1e6cde8f9b791d9cf61aa0e7b02cf5bbe8b1
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e1a1bc4f5a42747c08130b8242ebebd1210b32f