The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applicationsThere is no fixed version for RHEL:10 kernel-debug-devel-matched.
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel-debug-devel-matched package and not the kernel-debug-devel-matched package as distributed by RHEL.
See How to fix? for RHEL:10 relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-auth: reject short AUTH_RECEIVE buffers
nvmet_execute_auth_receive() trusts the AUTH_RECEIVE allocation length after checking only that it is nonzero and matches the transfer length. In the SUCCESS1 and FAILURE1/default states, that lets a remote NVMe-oF initiator reach the fixed-size DH-HMAC-CHAP response builders with a kmalloc() buffer shorter than the response, so nvmet_auth_success1() and nvmet_auth_failure1() write past the allocation; both only WARN_ON the short length and then format the message anyway.
Impact: A remote NVMe-oF initiator with access to an auth-enabled target can trigger a 16-byte heap out-of-bounds write via a one-byte AUTH_RECEIVE allocation length.
Compute the minimum response length for the current DH-HMAC-CHAP step in nvmet_auth_receive_data_len() and report a zero data length when the host-supplied allocation length is shorter, so the existing zero-length check in nvmet_execute_auth_receive() rejects the command before any builder runs. The SUCCESS1 minimum is sizeof(struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_success1_data) plus the HMAC hash length, because the response hash is written into the rval[] flexible-array tail, so the minimum is state dependent rather than a flat sizeof. CHALLENGE keeps its existing variable-length guard in nvmet_auth_challenge().
This is reachable only when in-band DH-HMAC-CHAP authentication is configured on the target.