Integer Overflow or Wraparound The advisory has been revoked - it doesn't affect any version of package kernel-modules-extra-matched (opens in a new tab)
Threat Intelligence
The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applications- Snyk IDSNYK-RHEL10-KERNELMODULESEXTRAMATCHED-16258293
- published25 Apr 2026
- disclosed24 Apr 2026
Introduced: 24 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-31641 (opens in a new tab)Amendment
The Red Hat security team deemed this advisory irrelevant for RHEL:10.
NVD Description
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel-modules-extra-matched package and not the kernel-modules-extra-matched package as distributed by RHEL.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix RxGK token loading to check bounds
rxrpc_preparse_xdr_yfs_rxgk() reads the raw key length and ticket length from the XDR token as u32 values and passes each through round_up(x, 4) before using the rounded value for validation and allocation. When the raw length is >= 0xfffffffd, round_up() wraps to 0, so the bounds check and kzalloc both use 0 while the subsequent memcpy still copies the original ~4 GiB value, producing a heap buffer overflow reachable from an unprivileged add_key() call.
Fix this by:
(1) Rejecting raw key lengths above AFSTOKEN_GK_KEY_MAX and raw ticket lengths above AFSTOKEN_GK_TOKEN_MAX before rounding, consistent with the caps that the RxKAD path already enforces via AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX.
(2) Sizing the flexible-array allocation from the validated raw key length via struct_size_t() instead of the rounded value.
(3) Caching the raw lengths so that the later field assignments and memcpy calls do not re-read from the token, eliminating a class of TOCTOU re-parse.
The control path (valid token with lengths within bounds) is unaffected.
References
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2461548
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-31641
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:27288
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3e04596cba8a86cbff9c3f4bf0a524a3a488773c
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49875b360c2b83a3c226e189c502e501d83e6445
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d179a868dd755b0cfcf7582e00943d702b9943b8