Out-of-bounds Read Affecting kernel-zfcpdump package, versions *


Severity

Recommended
medium

Based on Red Hat Enterprise Linux security rating.

Threat Intelligence

EPSS
0.32% (25th percentile)

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  • Snyk IDSNYK-RHEL10-KERNELZFCPDUMP-19936477
  • published19 Sept 2026
  • disclosed11 Sept 2026

Introduced: 11 Sep 2026

NewCVE-2026-89632  (opens in a new tab)
CWE-125  (opens in a new tab)

How to fix?

There is no fixed version for RHEL:10 kernel-zfcpdump.

NVD Description

Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel-zfcpdump package and not the kernel-zfcpdump package as distributed by RHEL. See How to fix? for RHEL:10 relevant fixed versions and status.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: fix use-before-check of ReparseDataLength in reparse_buf_ptr()

reparse_buf_ptr() reads buf->ReparseDataLength before checking that count covers the full fixed header:

buf = (struct reparse_data_buffer *)((u8 *)io + off);
len = sizeof(*buf);                          /* 8 bytes */
rdlen = le16_to_cpu(buf->ReparseDataLength); /* offset 4, 2 bytes */

if (count < len || count < rdlen + len) /* check comes after */

struct reparse_data_buffer has ReparseDataLength at offset 4. If a server returns OutputCount < 6, the read at offset 4-5 reaches past the end of the received data. The off+count bounds against iov_len were already validated, but that does not protect against count being smaller than sizeof(*buf).

Split the check: verify count >= sizeof(*buf) before reading ReparseDataLength, then verify count covers the data region.

CVSS Base Scores

version 3.1