Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key Affecting openstack-keystone package, versions *


Severity

Recommended
0.0
medium
0
10

Based on Red Hat Enterprise Linux security rating.

Threat Intelligence

EPSS
0.38% (30th percentile)

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  • Snyk IDSNYK-RHEL10-OPENSTACKKEYSTONE-19671587
  • published11 Sept 2026
  • disclosed26 Aug 2026

Introduced: 26 Aug 2026

CVE-2026-80183  (opens in a new tab)
CWE-639  (opens in a new tab)

How to fix?

There is no fixed version for RHEL:10 openstack-keystone.

NVD Description

Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream openstack-keystone package and not the openstack-keystone package as distributed by RHEL. See How to fix? for RHEL:10 relevant fixed versions and status.

In OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3, any authenticated user holding role:reader on any project can list every project-scoped role assignment under any domain by passing a domain ID as scope.project.id with include_subtree to the GET /v3/role_assignments endpoint. The domain's project record has domain_id=null, causing the policy domain_id check to pass for any caller. With include_names, the response discloses the names and home-domain IDs of every user, group, project, and role involved. The literal "default" domain ID works against any deployment created with keystone-manage bootstrap. An attacker can harvest domain IDs from the response and repeat the query to map role assignments across the entire cloud. This is caused by misuse of "None" in 

list_role_assignments_for_tree.

CVSS Base Scores

version 3.1