Improper Validation of Consistency within Input The advisory has been revoked - it doesn't affect any version of package perf (opens in a new tab)
Threat Intelligence
The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
Do your applications use this vulnerable package?
In a few clicks we can analyze your entire application and see what components are vulnerable in your application, and suggest you quick fixes.
Test your applications- Snyk IDSNYK-RHEL10-PERF-16369282
- published4 May 2026
- disclosed1 May 2026
Introduced: 1 May 2026
CVE-2026-31709 (opens in a new tab)Amendment
The Red Hat security team deemed this advisory irrelevant for RHEL:10.
NVD Description
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream perf package and not the perf package as distributed by RHEL.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl
build_sec_desc() and id_mode_to_cifs_acl() derive a DACL pointer from a server-supplied dacloffset and then use the incoming ACL to rebuild the chmod/chown security descriptor.
The original fix only checked that the struct smb_acl header fits before reading dacl_ptr->size or dacl_ptr->num_aces. That avoids the immediate header-field OOB read, but the rewrite helpers still walk ACEs based on pdacl->num_aces with no structural validation of the incoming DACL body.
A malicious server can return a truncated DACL that still contains a header, claims one or more ACEs, and then drive replace_sids_and_copy_aces() or set_chmod_dacl() past the validated extent while they compare or copy attacker-controlled ACEs.
Factor the DACL structural checks into validate_dacl(), extend them to validate each ACE against the DACL bounds, and use the shared validator before the chmod/chown rebuild paths. parse_dacl() reuses the same validator so the read-side parser and write-side rewrite paths agree on what constitutes a well-formed incoming DACL.
References
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2464476
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-31709
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0a8cf165566ba55a39fd0f4de172119dd646d39a
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b78db9bddc84136f6a0bb49e8883cf200dfb87a8
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d92f3f0b22414e7515696a02224d0af55e3004a3
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e47d297e7cf9a6029a0d38e7b22faba7d7aaf12