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External Control of File Name or Path The advisory has been revoked - it doesn't affect any version of package python3.11-gitpython  (opens in a new tab)

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EPSS
0.35% (29th percentile)

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  • Snyk IDSNYK-RHEL10-PYTHON311GITPYTHON-21407232
  • published22 Oct 2026
  • disclosed21 Oct 2026
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Introduced: 21 Oct 2026

NewCVE-2026-114145  (opens in a new tab)
CWE-73  (opens in a new tab)

Amendment

The Red Hat security team deemed this advisory irrelevant for RHEL:10.

NVD Description

Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream python3.11-gitpython package and not the python3.11-gitpython package as distributed by RHEL.

GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to 3.2.1, create_submodule() in git/objects/submodule/base.py accepts an attacker-influenced submodule path such as .git/hooks and invokes _clone_repo() before safely rejecting the destination. In 3.1.x, _validate_repo_path() does not exist and the call succeeds silently, while in 3.2.0 and later affected revisions the check in git/index/base.py raises ValueError only after the clone has written to disk and does not remove the planted file. An attacker-controlled submodule can therefore place an executable post-checkout hook that a later Git operation executes. Exploitation requires an application to accept an untrusted submodule path and a clone destination such as .git/hooks that is empty enough for Git to clone into it, which commonly means that default sample hooks are absent. This issue is fixed in version 3.2.1.