Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size The advisory has been revoked - it doesn't affect any version of package rtla  (opens in a new tab)


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  • Snyk IDSNYK-RHEL10-RTLA-15709604
  • published20 Mar 2026
  • disclosed18 Mar 2026

Introduced: 18 Mar 2026

CVE-2026-23243  (opens in a new tab)
CWE-131  (opens in a new tab)

Amendment

The Red Hat security team deemed this advisory irrelevant for RHEL:10.

NVD Description

Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream rtla package and not the rtla package as distributed by RHEL.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

RDMA/umad: Reject negative data_len in ib_umad_write

ib_umad_write computes data_len from user-controlled count and the MAD header sizes. With a mismatched user MAD header size and RMPP header length, data_len can become negative and reach ib_create_send_mad(). This can make the padding calculation exceed the segment size and trigger an out-of-bounds memset in alloc_send_rmpp_list().

Add an explicit check to reject negative data_len before creating the send buffer.

KASAN splat: [ 211.363464] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ib_create_send_mad+0xa01/0x11b0 [ 211.364077] Write of size 220 at addr ffff88800c3fa1f8 by task spray_thread/102 [ 211.365867] ib_create_send_mad+0xa01/0x11b0 [ 211.365887] ib_umad_write+0x853/0x1c80