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HTTP Request Smuggling Affecting eap7-ironjacamar-validator package, versions <0:1.4.30-1.Final_redhat_00001.1.el7eap

Severity

 Recommended
0.0
medium
0
10

Based on Red Hat Enterprise Linux security rating.

Threat Intelligence

EPSS
15.24% (96th percentile)

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  • Snyk IDSNYK-RHEL7-EAP7IRONJACAMARVALIDATOR-5307824
  • published26 Mar 2023
  • disclosed9 Mar 2021
Report a new vulnerability Found a mistake?

Introduced: 9 Mar 2021

CVE-2021-21295  (opens in a new tab)
CWE-444  (opens in a new tab)

How to fix?

Upgrade RHEL:7 eap7-ironjacamar-validator to version 0:1.4.30-1.Final_redhat_00001.1.el7eap or higher.
This issue was patched in RHSA-2021:2047.

NVD Description

Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream eap7-ironjacamar-validator package and not the eap7-ironjacamar-validator package as distributed by RHEL. See How to fix? for RHEL:7 relevant fixed versions and status.

Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by Http2MultiplexHandler as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (HttpRequest, HttpContent, etc.) via Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true: HTTP2MultiplexCodec or Http2FrameCodec is used, Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom ChannelInboundHandler that is put in the ChannelPipeline behind Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec.

References

CVSS Scores

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