Race Condition Affecting openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-8 package, versions *
Threat Intelligence
The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applications- Snyk IDSNYK-RHEL7-OPENSHIFTOSERHELCOREOS8-19786318
- published14 Sept 2026
- disclosed11 Sept 2026
Introduced: 11 Sep 2026
NewCVE-2026-89472 (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
There is no fixed version for RHEL:7 openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-8.
NVD Description
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-8 package and not the openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-8 package as distributed by RHEL.
See How to fix? for RHEL:7 relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: supply: charger-manager: register regulators before exposing sysfs
charger_manager_remove() and the err_reg_extcon probe error path free each charger regulator with regulator_put() before tearing down the power_supply sysfs entries (power_supply_unregister()). charger_manager_remove() also calls try_charger_enable(cm, false) after the regulator_put() loop. A concurrent write to a charger's externally_control sysfs attribute that lands between regulator_put() and power_supply_unregister() can run charger_externally_control_store() and call try_charger_enable(), which, when charging is enabled, dereferences the already-freed consumer handle. When charging is enabled, try_charger_enable(cm, false) in .remove() also dereferences the freed handles directly. Both leave use-after-free windows. Symmetrically, probe registers the sysfs entries (power_supply_register) before acquiring the regulators (regulator_get, inside charger_manager_register_extcon), so userspace can reach externally_control before the regulators are available.
Split charger_manager_register_extcon() on the sync/async boundary: charger_manager_get_regulators() (regulator_get only, no async producer) now runs before power_supply_register() so sysfs is not live before regulators are available, and charger_manager_register_extcon() keeps only the extcon notifier/work setup, still after power_supply_register() so a power_supply_register() failure cannot reach extcon setup. This keeps the sysfs setup/teardown ordering symmetric without introducing an asynchronous producer on the earlier probe-error path.
Move power_supply_unregister() and try_charger_enable(cm, false) ahead of the regulator_put() loop on both teardown paths, and adjust err_reg_extcon (power_supply_unregister() then fall through err_regulator for regulator_put(); get_regulators self-rolls back on its own failure).
This does not address the separate extcon-notifier-driven deref of the same handles, which needs its own synchronization design.
Found by an in-house static analysis tool.
References
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-89472
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6d532582ff3c420598f02945b13184c738cc1581
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/86e4fa65368f3bbb506dddba8c9eedc75bd603b2
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/af3ce383ba0d0d48957a22ac7058ff5698775898
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c57cb36f76eb7ced45f57af1a890d8f3a6d76342