Race Condition Affecting kernel-debug package, versions <0:4.18.0-477.74.1.el8_8
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Test your applications- Snyk ID SNYK-RHEL8-KERNELDEBUG-8086543
- published 24 Sep 2024
- disclosed 24 Apr 2024
Introduced: 24 Apr 2024
CVE-2024-26923 Open this link in a new tabHow to fix?
Upgrade RHEL:8
kernel-debug
to version 0:4.18.0-477.74.1.el8_8 or higher.
This issue was patched in RHSA-2024:6993
.
NVD Description
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel-debug
package and not the kernel-debug
package as distributed by RHEL
.
See How to fix?
for RHEL:8
relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()
Garbage collector does not take into account the risk of embryo getting enqueued during the garbage collection. If such embryo has a peer that carries SCM_RIGHTS, two consecutive passes of scan_children() may see a different set of children. Leading to an incorrectly elevated inflight count, and then a dangling pointer within the gc_inflight_list.
sockets are AF_UNIX/SOCK_STREAM S is an unconnected socket L is a listening in-flight socket bound to addr, not in fdtable V's fd will be passed via sendmsg(), gets inflight count bumped
connect(S, addr) sendmsg(S, [V]); close(V) __unix_gc()
NS = unix_create1() skb1 = sock_wmalloc(NS) L = unix_find_other(addr) unix_state_lock(L) unix_peer(S) = NS // V count=1 inflight=0
NS = unix_peer(S)
skb2 = sock_alloc()
skb_queue_tail(NS, skb2[V])
// V became in-flight
// V count=2 inflight=1
close(V)
// V count=1 inflight=1
// GC candidate condition met
for u in gc_inflight_list:
if (total_refs == inflight_refs)
add u to gc_candidates
// gc_candidates={L, V}
for u in gc_candidates:
scan_children(u, dec_inflight)
// embryo (skb1) was not
// reachable from L yet, so V&#39;s
// inflight remains unchanged
__skb_queue_tail(L, skb1) unix_state_unlock(L) for u in gc_candidates: if (u.inflight) scan_children(u, inc_inflight_move_tail)
// V count=1 inflight=2 (!)
If there is a GC-candidate listening socket, lock/unlock its state. This makes GC wait until the end of any ongoing connect() to that socket. After flipping the lock, a possibly SCM-laden embryo is already enqueued. And if there is another embryo coming, it can not possibly carry SCM_RIGHTS. At this point, unix_inflight() can not happen because unix_gc_lock is already taken. Inflight graph remains unaffected.
References
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-26923
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e2a03787f4f0abc0072350654ab0ef3324d9db3
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/343c5372d5e17b306db5f8f3c895539b06e3177f
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/47d8ac011fe1c9251070e1bd64cb10b48193ec51
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/507cc232ffe53a352847893f8177d276c3b532a9
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a36ae0ec2353015f0f6762e59f4c2dbc0c906423
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b75722be422c276b699200de90527d01c602ea7c
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dbdf7bec5c920200077d693193f989cb1513f009
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e76c2678228f6aec74b305ae30c9374cc2f28a51
- https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00017.html
- https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00020.html