The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applicationsThere is no fixed version for RHEL:8 kernel-modules-internal.
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel-modules-internal package and not the kernel-modules-internal package as distributed by RHEL.
See How to fix? for RHEL:8 relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: account classifier filter allocations to memcg
Allocations in the tc classifier *_change() paths (filter objects, per-CPU counters, and per-filter aux data) use plain GFP_KERNEL without __GFP_ACCOUNT, allowing unprivileged users to pin kernel memory outside memcg charging. The shared tcf_exts_init_ex() action array allocation in cls_api.c was also uncharged; this patch closes it along with the per-classifier filter-object/percpu/aux allocations that remain unaccounted.
Add GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT to:
Also fix the cls_basic error path: basic_change() inserts fnew into the IDR before allocating the per-CPU counter. If alloc_percpu() fails the errout path kfree'd fnew without idr_remove, leaving a dangling pointer in the IDR. With GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT the percpu alloc becomes failable on demand (memcg at memory.max), making the dead path attacker-reachable and burning the handle permanently. Add the idr_remove on the percpu failure path, matching the basic_set_parms failure-path pattern.
Note: vega@nebusec.ai provided a poc for basic_cls, but it was easy to extend to the other classifiers.
Conditions to recreate the bug: